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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Danielle Mona Lisa Duff appeals from a jury verdict finding her guilty of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, Duff challenges the 
introduction of certain evidence at trial as well as the denial of her motion for a 
new trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Officer Mumford stopped Duff because she was "not keeping her vehicle 
in the lane of travel." (JT Tr., p.123, Ls.22-23.) Because of Duff's driving pattern 
and the smell of alcohol coming from her vehicle, Officer Mumford administered 
standardized field sobriety tests (FSTs) to Duff. (JT Tr., p.123, L.20 - p.129, 
L.13.) Following the FSTs, Officer Mumford arrested Duff for driving under the 
influence. (JT Tr., p.143, Ls.17-21.) Duff had a recorded breath sample of .119 
(JT Tr., p.165, L.21 - p.166, L.1) and the state charged her with felony driving 
under the influence based on a previous felony driving under the influence 
conviction in 2010 (R., pp.45-46, 155-156). 
The matter proceeded to jury trial wherein Officer Mumford was the only 
witness to testify. Regarding the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN), the 
officer testified to the following: 
During the evaluation, you look for do their eyes - are they 
tracking and are they smooth tracking. There are two points, or a 
point per eye, for that. There is [sic] two more points awarded or 
two more points taken away for nystagmus at max deviation. In 
other words, when you bring your stimulus out to the corner of a 
person's face, you do what they call burying the eyes. In other 
words, you make sure that the eye is brought all the way over to the 
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side. And there should be nothing more than a very small corner or 
a very small sliver of white showing on the corner of their eye as 
their eyes are completely over. You do this for both eyes. So you 
award a point or you take a point away based on both eyes. 
What you are looking for at that point when you bury the 
eyes is a nystagmus. And a nystagmus is just the involuntary 
jerking of the eyes. So it is accentuated by alcohol and certain 
drugs. And when you bring this over to the corner of their eyes, 
you have to bring it over, hold it for a count of up to four seconds or 
more than four seconds, and so then the nystagmus or this 
bouncing of the eyes, as it may be, it has to be distinct and 
sustained. In other words, I could make a person's eyes bounce by 
bringing the eyes over to the side, because your eyes will come 
over and sort of stop and then bounce like a little ball. But what you 
are looking for is that eye to continue bouncing as you put it over in 
the spot. 
So what you do is you start off, you bring it over, you start 
and you always go to their left. You bring it to their left. You bring it 
back to their right. You bring it back to their left, and then you bring 
it back to their right. And each time you are checking. The first 
time you are looking for the symptoms and the second time you are 
just confirming the symptoms that you have seen. So that's the 
second part. 
The third part is whether there's nystagmus prior to 45 
degrees. And 45 degrees is basically off the points of the shoulder, 
straight out and away from them. And you will stop their eyes at 
45, or you move their eyes over to the 45. You don't want to bury 
their eyes. You want to have that off at 45. And you are looking at 
and seeing whether the person's eyes, once again, there is a 
nystagmus and it is a [sic] distinct and sustained. 
So as you bring the eyes over, the eyes will start bouncing or 
you can bring it over. And where it starts bouncing is where you 
stop. At 45 degrees - when you look at your 45 degrees, the 
chances are likely or better than likely that the person is under the 
influence. 
(JT Tr., p.132, L.4 - p.133, L.25.) Duff objected to the officer's last statement on 
the basis of foundation (JT Tr., p.134, L.2), one of 34 objections made throughout 
Officer Mumford's direct examination (see generally JT Tr., p.110, L.14 - p.148, 
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L.4, p.154, L.18 - p.170, L.14). The court overruled the objection based on the 
officer's "[t]raining and experience." (JT Tr., p.134, L.3.) 
The jury found Duff guilty of driving under the influence. (R., p.200; JT Tr., 
p.216, Ls.9-17.) The DUI enhancement was ultimately tried before the court who 
found the evidence sufficient for a felony conviction. (R., p.251.) Duff filed a 
motion for a new trial, asserting the court "misdirect[ed] the jury in a matter of 
law" by "bolster[ing] the Deputy's testimony." (R., p.232.) The court denied the 
motion after a hearing, finding the court "did not misdirect the jury as a matter of 
law, and that Jury Instruction No. 6 served to neutralize the impact of any 
comments made by the Court." (R., p.241.) 
The court placed Duff on three years of supervised probation with an 
underlying sentence of five years fixed followed by five years indeterminate. (R., 
p.259; 6/15/14 Tr., p.51, Ls.23-25.) Duff timely appealed. (R., pp.258-269.) 
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ISSUES 
Duff states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted 
testimony from Officer Mumford regarding the likelihood of 
intoxication based on HGN results? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Duff's Motion for New Trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Duff failed to show error in the trial court's admission of testimony by 
Officer Mumford? 
2. Has Duff failed to show error in the court's denial of her motion for a new 
trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Duff Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Officer Mumford's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Duff asserts on appeal that the district court erred by overruling her 
objection to Officer Mumford's "opinion about the relationship between 
nystagmus and the likelihood of intoxication." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) Duff 
argues, as she did below, that there was insufficient foundation laid for said 
"erroneous opinion" and that its admission by the court based on "Officer 
Mumford's 'training and experience'" was error. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) Duff 
has failed to establish error in the admission of Officer Mumford's general 
testimony regarding the HGN aspect of the FSTs. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). 
C. Duff Has Failed To Show That The Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing Officer Mumford's Testimony Describing The HGN 
At trial, Officer Mumford testified at length about the three parts of the 
HGN, what was required for each step, what he looked for in administering the 
test, and the purpose of the HGN. (JT Tr., p.132, L.4 - p.133, L.25.) After 
describing the test in detail, Officer Mumford made the general statement that 
with a certain performance on the HGN, "the chances are likely or better than 
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likely that the person is under the influence." (JT Tr., p.133, Ls.24-25.) Duff 
objected, stating only "[f]oundation." (JT Tr., p.134, L.2.) The court overruled the 
objection based on "[t]raining and experience." (JTTr., p.134, L.3.) 
On appeal Duff argues the court "abused its discretion when it allowed 
Officer Mumford to opine about the relationship between the HGN test and a 
person's likelihood of being under the influence." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Duff 
does not challenge the officer's ultimate conclusion that he believed Duff was 
under the influence. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) Instead, she argues the general 
statement made was improperly admitted because the state failed to lay 
foundation for the officer's "erroneous opinion" and the opinion itself is precluded 
by Idaho Supreme Court precedent. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) Both of Duff's 
arguments fail. 
Prior to Officer Mumford's explanation of the HGN test he testified as to 
his life experience, military experience, and his law enforcement experience 
including completing an HGN class, obtaining a drug recognition certification, 
acting as a FST instructor for the state, and making "well over" 1200 driving 
under the influence arrests. (JT Tr., p.110, L.22 - p.121, L.14.) The court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the officer to testify as to the general link between 
HGN and intoxication in light of the extensive foundation the state had previously 
laid regarding Officer Mumford's training and experience in administering HGN 
tests and interpreting the results of those tests in relation to DUI investigations. 
Duff does not indicate how the foundation for Officer Mumford's testimony 
was inadequate; rather she asserts that the statement itself was impermissible. 
6 
To support her position, Duff cites to Idaho Supreme Court holdings in State v. 
Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991), and State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 
62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992), for the proposition that "the arresting officer is only 
permitted to testify that nystagmus may be an indicator of intoxication, not that it 
is conclusive evidence". (Appellant's brief, p.8 (citations omitted; emphasis 
original).) This claim that Duff's statement itself was impermissible was not the 
objection before the trial court. "Generally, issues not raised below may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho 597, 600, 
166 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). Specifically regarding 
objections made at trial, "[a]n objection is not preserved for review when the 
objection argued on appeal was [] distinct from that raised below." lg. Because 
Duff only objected to the officer's statements on a foundational basis, the Court 
should not consider her new argument on appeal. 
If the court does consider Duff's argument on appeal, the only "opinion" 
Duff objected to at trial was a general statement by the officer that "when you 
look at your 45 degrees, the chances are likely or better than likely that the 
person is under the influence." (JT Tr., p.133, Ls.23-25.) This statement was not 
offered as an independent basis for the officer's conclusion that Duff was under 
the influence. It was not offered as anything other than a generalization of the 
correlation between nystagmus and intoxication. Contrary to Duff's assertion on 
appeal, this is not specifically precluded. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
distinguished between circumstances such as those in the case at hand and 
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statements prescribing a direct causal link to an HGN result alone and a specific 
level of intoxication: 
The theory underlying the HGN test is sound, but HGN test results 
may only be used to draw certain inferences. As circumstantial 
evidence of intoxication, a positive HGN test result alone is not 
evidence of a certain degree of blood alcohol content. 
Garrett, 119 Idaho at 882, 811 P.2d at 492. 
The Court has made clear that the science of the HGN test is valid and 
that the results of such tests are admissible as part of the entire picture present 
to an investigation officer: 
Garrett allows the use of HGN test evidence only in conjunction 
with evidence from other field sobriety tests, and permits the 
arresting officer to testify only that the nystagmus may be an 
indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Garrett 
limits the scope of the admissibility of HGN-related evidence, 
forbidding its use to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC 
level, because nystagmus does stem from causes other than the 
ingestion of alcohol. 
[The officer's] testimony relating to the HGN test results was not 
offered as independent scientifically sound evidence of Gleason's 
intoxication. Rather, it was offered and admitted for the same 
purpose as other field sobriety test evidence-a physical act on the 
part of [the defendant] observed by the officer contributing to the 
cumulative portrait of [the defendant] intimating intoxication in the 
officer's opinion. 
Gleason, 123 Idaho at 66, 844 P.2d at 695 (italics original). The generalized 
statement offered by Officer Mumford linking the appearance of nystagmus with 
the "chances" of being under the influence does not offend the Court's holding 
regarding the admissibility of HGN-related evidence. 
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Duff also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Officer Mumford's 
statement--that "by looking at her eyes alone" "there was a very good likelihood 
[Duff]" Duff was under the influence"-- was inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-
8.) "Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first 
time on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged 
qualifies as fundamental error. lsl, at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Duff has not even 
argued, much less demonstrated, fundamental error. 
This complained-of and unobjected-to statement did not stand alone. 
Officer Mumford made the statement in response to the prosecutor's question 
regarding what his observations of Duff's performance on the HGN test indicated 
to him. (JT Tr., p.134, L.23 - p.135, L.1.) The testimony then immediately 
turned to the remaining FSTs (JT Tr., p.135, L.4 - p.143, L.21) and ultimately 
Officer Mumford's opinion, based on all of the evaluations performed, that Duff 
was under the influence of alcohol (JT Tr., p.144, Ls.13-15). As the Court has 
held, this is evidence of "a physical act on the part of' Duff "observed by the 
officer contributing to the cumulative portrait of [Duff] intimating intoxication in the 
officer's opinion." Gleason, 123 Idaho at 66, 844 P.2d at 695. As such, Duff has 
failed to show any error in the officer's statement about what Duff's HGN 
performance indicated to him, much less any constitutional error. Therefore, Duff 
has not met her burden under the first prong of Perry and the Court should not 
consider Duff's unpreserved claim of error. Finally, even if the district court erred 
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in admitting the officer's statement, such error was harmless. Trial error will be 
deemed harmless if the reviewing court is convinced beyond a reasonable that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 
979. Any erroneous admission of evidence related to HGN testing was also 
harmless because of additional evidence showing Duff was under the influence, 
including breath testing showing an alcohol concentration of .119. (JT Tr., o.165, 
L.21 - p.166, L.1.) 
11. 
Duff Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Duff next claims error in the district court's denial of her motion for a new 
trial. Application of the correct legal standards to the grounds on which Duff 
sought a new trial shows the district court properly denied the motion. Duff has 
failed to show otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the court 
abused that discretion. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 
(1995). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Duff's Motion For A New Trial 
Idaho law permits a district court to order a new trial if the court has "erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 
10 
19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the standard that the trial court 
applies when considering a motion for a new trial, directing that "[t]he court ... 
may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice." 
Whether the interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64, 
122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Duff's motion for a new trial alleged the court erred in overruling an 
objection to a portion of Officer Mumford's testimony "and in doing so reiterated 
at length, in the presence of the jury, the training and schooling of the officer, in 
such a manner that the trier of fact could have and probably did take it as a 
judicial instruction." (R., p.232.) The entire complained-of exchange is as 
follows: 
Q [by the state]: And upon your initial contact with Ms. 
Duff what observations did you make? 
A [by Officer Mumford]: When I first contacted her I told 
her the reason why I am stopping her. I tell her she is not keeping 
her vehicle in the lane of travel. She makes a comment that her 
vehicle is really squirrelly. And I explained to her about the fact of 
well, you have got to keep it in your lane of travel. You have got to 
stay there. And at the same time I am also asking for drivers [sic] 
license, registration, proof of insurance. And this is sort of a - this 
is a technique that as being trained in, is you talk to the people and 
you ask for several things at the same time. And it's basically built 
on the fact of can they do numerous things at one time. In other 
words, talk to me and look for the objects I have asked for. I asked 
for driver's license, registration, proof of insurance. She is turned 
away from me digging into her console or glove box finding these 
objects for me. At the same time she makes a statement of this 
vehicle is - it drives real squirrelly or something of that nature. And 
then she makes a statement about she has an even hard time 
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controlling it even when she is sober which sort of struck me odd 
because that's -
MR. CHAPMAN [counsel for Duff]: Your honor, 
how these statements struck the witness is immaterial. We are 
looking for facts, not his opinion at this point. I object. 
THE COURT: 
investigation. 
Overruled. It is a part of this 
BY MS. JALALI [for the state]: Go ahead, sir. 
A: It just sort of struck me as odd. It is just not 
something people normally make a statement like that at first. 
MR. CHAPMAN: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He has testified he has 2500 
hours of training. He is POST certified at the masters level. He 
has over 1200 DUI arrests and he has participated in intentional 
dosing of persons to test. 
(JT Tr., p.123, L.18 - p.125, L4.) In denying Duff's motion for a new trial, the 
court rejected Duff's argument that the manner in which it overruled Duff's 
evidentiary objection either bolstered the officer's testimony or accounted to an 
improper instruction. The court noted the jury had been properly instructed1 to 
only consider admitted evidence and not be influenced by any of the court's 
comments and, as there was "no indication in the case at bar that the jury did not 
1 Jury Instruction No. 6 states: 
If during the trial I may say or do anything that suggests to 
you that I am inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, 
you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such 
suggestion. I will not express or intend to express, nor will I intend 
to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy 
of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what inferences 
should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine 
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I 
instruct you to disregard it. 
(R., p.182.) 
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follow the court's instructions," the court "did not misdirect the jury as a matter of 
law." (R., pp.240-241.) 
On appeal, Duff contends the court's summary of the officer's training and 
experience in overruling her objection was akin to "a mid-trial closing argument 
on behalf of the State." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) That argument is not well 
taken. Duff's objection at trial was based on a lack of foundation for Officer 
Mumford's statement that Duff's admission that her car was hard to handle even 
when she was sober was unusual. (JT Tr., p.124, Ls.22-25.) In response to the 
foundational objection, the court reiterated the foundation upon which the officer 
found Duff's statement odd and its usefulness in his DUI investigation. (JT Tr., 
p.125, Ls.1-4.) The court's comments were directly responsive to the specific 
objection before it and not an improper comment on the strength of the state's 
case. Even if the statements could be construed as an improper comment, any 
error would be harmless. Here, the court specifically instructed the jury to 
disregard any "expression" of the court which would "seem[ ] to indicate an 
opinion" on any matters before it. (R., p.182.) Presuming, as this Court must, 
that the jury followed the instruction, there is no possibility the jury viewed the 
court's comments as comments on the state's case or the credibility of its 
witness. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (Idaho appellate 
courts "presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given."). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Duff's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DA TED this 22nd day of ' 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of April, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE APPE..........-..-.... 
NLS/pm 
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